Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

The State of Utah v. Eugene O. Christensen : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; William K. McGuire; Attorneys for Appellant;
C. Demont Judd, Jr.; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Christensen, No. 18365 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3071

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Appellant,

.•

-v-

••

Case No. 18365

••

EUGENE O. CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.

••

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Interlocutory appeal from a pre-trial Order granting
the responaent's Motion to Suppress Evidence, in the Second
Judicial District Court, in and for Davis County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, presiding •
•

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
WILLIAM K. McGUIRE
Deputy Davis County Attorney
Davis·County Courthouse
Farmington, UT 84025
Attorneys for Appellant

C. DEMONT JUDD, JR.
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 103
Ogden, UT 84401
Attorney for Respondent

FILED
AUG 171982

----------··---.......... Cled. Sapr... Court, Ut~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

.•
.
.

Case No. 18365

EUGENE O. CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.

..

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Interlocutory appeal from a pre-trial Order granting
the respondent's Motion to Suppress Evidence, in the Second
Judicial District Court, in and for Davis County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, presiding.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
WILLIAM K. McGUIRE
Deputy Davis County Attorney
Davis County Courthouse
Farmington, UT 84025
Attorneys for Appellant
C. DEMONT JUDD, JR.
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 103
Ogden, UT 84401
Attorney for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE • .

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT . •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS • •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

2

THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE
ARREST OF RESPONDENT WAS INVALID • . . • .

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
l?O INT II.

CONCLUSION.

EVEN IF THE ARREST OF RESPONDENT WAS
INVALID, IT WAS ERROR TO SUPPRESS THE
EVIDENCE ACQUIRED PRIOR TO THE ARREST.
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

12

•

•

15

Cases Cited
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). • • • • . • . . • •
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). • • •
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) • • • .
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). • • • •
Fisher v. United States, 324 F.2d 775 (Ca. 8 1963). •
Fri s bi e v. Co 11 ins , 3 4 2 U • S • 5 19 ( 19 5 2 ) • • • • • • •
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). . . . • .
Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 ( 1926). • •
People v. Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832 (Cal. App. 1968)
State v. Anderson, Utah, 618 P.2d 42 (1980) • • • • •
State v. Beck, Utah, 584 P.2d 870 (1978). . . . . . •
State v. Eastwood, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 276 (1972)
State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 1125 (1977) . • . . .
State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972)
State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969) •
State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103 (1980) • • •
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). • • •

8
9
8
8
12
13
8
8
8
13
13
9
13
9
9
9,13
14

Statutes Cited
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44 ( 19 81) • • • •
II
§ 41-6-44.20 n
• • • •
"
"
II
II
(1978)
§
76-5-102.
5
• •
"
II
II
§
76-5-101
•
•
"II
"II
n
§ 77-7-2
• •
"

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

•
•

.
•

9
9-10
1
6

• • 7,11,15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTENSEN,

.•
.
.•
.•

Defendant-Respondent.

••

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vEUGENE

o.

Case No • 18365

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent was charged by Information with Assault
by a Prisoner, a third-degree felony,

in violation of Utah

Code Ann.,§ 76-5-102.5 (1978).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent filed a pre-trial Motion to Suppress
Evidence in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby,
Judge, presiding.

On March 23, 1982, Judge Cornaby granted

the Motion to Suppress based on a finding that there were no
grounds nor probable cause for the initial arrest.

The Utah

Supreme Court granted this interlocutory appeal to review the
lower court's pre-trial Order on May 4, 1982.

The trial court

proceedings were stayed on May 11, 1982, pending the decision
of the Utah Supreme Court on appeal.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a judgment and order of this Court
declaring the initial arrest in this case to be a lawful
arrest and vacating the lower court Order granting
respondent's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 24, 1981, Officers James Andrews and
Roger Foote of the Layton City Police Department were
dispatched to a location on

~ntelo?e

Drive in Layton, Utah to

respond to a citizen's report that there was a pickup truck
and housetrailer stalled in the middle of the road and that
nearby a man who appeared to be intoxicated was staggering
down the roadway (T1 p. 8-9; T 2 p. 5-7).1

Neither

respondent, Eugene Oscar Christensen, nor his son, Brett
Christensen, was present when the officers arrived.

The keys

were in the truck's ignition, but the officers were unable to
start it.

An inspection of the truck produced an open

container of alcoholic beverage which was found in the truck's
passenger compartment (T1 p. 2).
Respondent's truck had run out of gasoline and had
come to rest, with the housetrailer in tow, partially

!All references to the transcript of the Pre-Trial
proceeding of March 2, 1982 will hereinafter be designated as
T1; all references in the transcript of the pre-trial Motion
to Suppress proceedings of March 23, 1982 will hereinafter be
designated as T2·

-2-
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obstructing the travelled portion of the roadway (T 2 p. 3).
Respondent waited near the truck while his son went to get
some gasoline, but when his son dio not return quickly he
became impatient and decided to walk to his son's house (T 2
p. 4).

Respondent's son told the officers that when

respondent arrived at his home they immediately returned to
the stalled truck (T1 p. 8).

They arrived approximately

five minutes after the officers arrived (T1 p. 8), and as
they approached the officers, Officer James Andrews asked
respondent if he was the owner and driver of the truck.
Respondent admitted that he was the owner and that he had been
driving it before it stalled (T1 p. 2; T2 p. 4, 8).
Later, during the suppression proceedings, respondent
recanted, insisting that it had been his son, not he, who had
been driving the vehicle (T2 p. 3).
Officer Roger Foote did not notice an odor of
alcohol when he spoke with respondent's son, but respondent
had been drinking (T2 p. 10; T1 p. 2).

The officers

conducted field sobriety tests and arrested respondent for
Driving Under the Influence and Open Container in a Motor
Vehicle (T 1 p. 8).

After respondent had been arrested and

handcuffed he violently kicked Officer Andrews, striking him
in the leg (T1 p. 3).
Respondent was taken to the Layton City Jail.
asked if he could be given some medical attention for a

-3-
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He

chronic back problem (T1 p. 4).

According to respondent,

his back problem had been inadvertently aggravated during the
arrest process, causing respondent to kick Officer Andrews
(T1 p. 3).

Sometime after respondent was charged with

Driving Under the Influence and Open Container in a Motor
Vehicle, both misdemeanors, and also Assault by a Prisoner, a
third-degree felony, he again retaliated against Officer
Andrews, striking him in the face with a closed fist (T1 p.
4) •

The Information charging Assault bv a Prisoner was

subsequently refiled after being amended to include both
assaults by respondent ( R. 2) •
Judge Bean of the Circuit court of Davis County
dismis sea the Driving Under the Influence and Open Container
in a Motor Vehicle charges and bound respondent over to the
Second Judicial District Court for trial on the Assault by a
Prisoner charge (R. 1).

Respondent requested that preliminary

examination of the Assault charge be waived and did not
challenge the probable cause for the arrest at that time (R.
1) •

Respondent filed a pre-trial Motion to Suppress
Evidence in the District Court seeking to have suppressed the
open container of alcoholic beverage found in the truck and
the statements he made prior to his arrest admitting that he
had been driving the vehicle.

On March 3, 1982, Judge Douglas

L. Cornaby granted the Motion to Suppress based on a finding
-4-
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that there were no grounds nor probable cause for the initial
arrest and that respondent was thereby entitled to have the
evidence obtained prior to arrest suppressed (R. 43).
Appellant pursued an interlocutory appeal of the
Order suppressing the evidence in the Utah Supreme Court.
This Court granted appellant's petition on May 4, 1982 (R. 29,
45).

On May 11, 1982, the trial proceedings in

the~-instant

case were stayed, pending the decision of this Court on
appeal.
Appellant takes this appeal from the pre-trial order
granting respondent's Motion to Suppress Evidence pursuant to
Rule 26(c}(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE
ARREST OF RESPONDENT WAS INVALID.
The lower court's order granting rP-spondent's Motion
to Suppress Evidence was based on a finding that:
At the time of the arrest the officers had
no grounds to make the arrest or no
probable cause to make the arrest. • • .
Since there was no grounds for arrest,
there is a defense to assult [sic] by a
prisoner and thereby he has a right to
suppression of the evidence of the
circumstances.
(R. 43).

Appellant submits that there was probable cause for

the arrest which culminated in the Assault by a Prisoner
-5-
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charge for which respondent is now being tried and that it was
clearly error for the lower court to grant respondent's Motion
to Suppress Evioence.
Although the evidence suppressed is not essential to
establish the elements of Assault by a Prisoner as charged,
the basis for the lower court's decision--that there was no
probable cause for the arrest--is crucial in that it
necessarily prevents the State from prosecuting the charge.
The statute unrler which respondent was charged provides "Any
prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily
injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree."
Ann.,§ 76-5-102.5 (1978).

Utah Code

Before respondent may be convicted

of Assault by a Prisoner he must first be found to have been a
"prisoner" at the time of the assault.

Utah Code Ann., §

76-5-101 (1978) provides the applicable definition of
"prisoner":
For the purposes of this part "prisoner"
means any person who is in custody of a
police officer pursuant to a lawful arrest
or who is confined in jail or other penal
institution regardless of whether the
confinement is legal [Emphasis supplied].
It is apparent from the above definition that in order to be
deemed a "prisoner" respondent must have been lawfully
arrested.

Because the lower court judge based the grant of

respondent's motion on a finding that there was no probable
cause for the arrest, or in other words that respondent was

-6-
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not lawfully arrested, he in effect decided the issue
perceived to be the gravamen in this case.2

If there was no

probable cause for the arrest in this case, respondent's
arrest could not have been "lawful."

Thus, he could not have

been a "prisoner" and as a result he could not have committed
Assault by a Prisoner as defined by the statute.

Were the

lower court's finding of a lack of probable cause for the
arrest correct, the State could not prove the elements of the
offense charged.
However, there was probable cause for respondent's
arrest.

Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-2 (1978) provides that a

police officer may arrest for a misdemeanor not committed

2The record suggests that the lower court judge
was inclined to adopt the view that this was the pivotal issue
and that it would dispose of the case (T2 pp. 13-14; R. 43).
Such a conclusion would be correct, but only with respect to
the first of the assaults for which respondent was charged.
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-5-101 (1978) defining "prisoner" provides
that a "prisoner" is one who is in custody pursuant to a
lawful arrest, "or who is confined in a jail • • • regardless
of whether the confinement is legal." The record is not
clear, but because the second assault occurred at the Layton
Police Department after respondent had been booked for the two
misdemeanors and the first assault, it apparently occurred
while he was "confined" and therefore the State might be able
to pursue the instant case baserl solely on the second assault.
Appellant submits, however, that the State's apparent ability
to go forward with the assault by a prisoner charge regardless
of the suppressed evidence or the lower court's finding of
insufficient probable cause for the arrest is immaterial to
this interlocutory appeal.
Even if viable, the opportunity
does not mitigate the impropriety of the Order granting the
Motion to Suppress Evidence, nor correct the lower court's
error.
Appellant should not be forced to proceed on only one
assault because of the erroneous ruling.
-7-
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in his presence:
A peace officer

may make an arrest under

authority of warrant, or may without a
warrant arrest a person: • . •
(3) When he has reasonable cause to
believe the person has committed a public
offense, and there is reasonable cause for
believing the person may:
(a) Flee or conceal himself to avoid
arrest;
(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the
commission of the offense; or
(c) Injure another person or damage
property belonging to another person.
The term ''public offense" includes all misdemeanors.

Oleson

v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507 251 P. 23, 24 (1926); People v.
Sjosten, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832, 835 (Cal. App. 1968).

"Reasonable

cause" as used in the statute is essentially a synonym for
"probable cause."

Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310

n. 3 (1959).
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that:
"[P]robable cause" to justify an arrest
means facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge that are sufficient to
warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing, in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has
committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense.
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).

See also:

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).

The Supreme Court has

-8-
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also stated:
In dealing with probable cause, however,
as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities.
These are not techn1cal;
they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175; reh. den.,
338 U.S. 839 (1949).

This Court has applied an essentially

identical standard:
The determination should be made on an
objective standard: whether from the
facts known to the officer, and the
inferences which might fairly be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person
in his position would be justified in
believing that the suspect had committed
the offense.
State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972).
See also:

State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103, 106

(1980); State v. Eastwood, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 276, 278
(1972); State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772, 775
(1969).

Contrary to respondent's argument in the lower court,

the officers did not have to prove the corpus delecti of the
crimes prior to the arrest.
Probable cause to arrest respondent for either
Driving Under the Influence (Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44 (1981))
or Open Container in a Motor Vehicle (Utah Code Ann., §
41-6-44.20 (1981)) would validate the arrest in this case.

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Examination of the information available to the officers prior
to the arrest reveals several facts and circumstances which,
when taken together, support the officers' determination that
respondent committed the offenses he was arrested for:
1. The officers had a report that an
individual approximately matching
respondent's description was seen
staggering in the street and traveling
away from the stalled truck and trailer a
short time before the officers arrived to
investigate (T1 pp. 8-9; T2 pp. 5-7).
2. Respondent admitted that he had left
the stalled vehicle to walk to his son's
house some time before the officers
arrived (T2 p. 4)o
3. Respondent's son stated that upon
respondent's arrival at the son's home,
they immediately returned to the stalled
truck ( T1 p. 8) .
4. Respondent admitted that he was owner
of the truck and had been driving it
before it stalled (T1 p. 2; T2 4,
8) • 3

5. The officers discovered an open
container of alcoholic beverage in the
passenger compartment of the truck (T1
p. 2) •
6.
Respondent's son did not appear to
have been drinking (T1 p. 2; T2 pp. 4,
8, 10).

3Respondent would not have to have been the driver
of the truck to be found guilty under Utah's Open Container
statute, Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-44.20 (1981). The statute
applies to all persons in the passenger compartment of a motor
vehicle.
-10-
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7. The officers conducted field sobriety
tests and determined that respondent was
under the influence of alcohol (T1 p.
8) •

Clearly, the above information and the inferences fairly drawn
therefrom provided reasonable or probable cause for
respondent's arrest.

Also clear is the reasonableness of the

officers' belief that respondent might:
(a) Flee • • • to avoid arrest; (b)
Destroy or conceal evidence • • • ; or (c)
Injure another person or damage property
belonging to another person.
Utah Code Ann.,

§

77-7-2(3)

(1978).

Respondent and his son

returned to the stalled truck intending to fuel it and drive
it away.

The officers could have reasonably assumed that in

order to accomplish this respondent intended to drive one of
the two vehicles present which were owned by either respondent
or his son.

Respondent might well have left the area, making

evidence on or in his person, or contained in the truck,
unavailable to the officers.

In addition, because respondent

was under the influence of alcohol, his driving one of the
vehicles from the area would have created a definite
possibility that injury to another person or damage to
property would have occurred.
The arrest was valid under the requirements of Utah
Cone Ann.,

§

77-7-2(3)

(1978).

The lower court incorrectly

ruled that the arrest was invalid, and the grant of
resoondent's Motion to Dismiss Evidence was error .
.&.;

-11-
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POINT II
EVEN IF THE ARREST OF RESPONDENT WAS
INVALID, IT WAS ERROR TO SUPPRESS THE
EVIDENCE ACQUIRED PRIOR TO THE ARREST.
Respondent successfully sought suppression of
evidence obtained prior to his arrest, specifically, the open
container of alcoholic beverage found in the truck and his
statement to the officers admitting that he was the truck's
owner and had been driving it before it stallen.

Respondent

did not challenge, and the court did not rely on, the
propriety or constitutionality of the investigation of the
truck which resulted in the discovery of the open container of
alcoholic beverage or the query which produced the admission
that respondent was the driver of the truck.4

The lower

court granted respondent's Motion to Suppress Evidence on the
bas is that "Since there was no grounds for arrest, • • • he
has a right to suppression of the circumstances" (R. 43; T2
p. 14, lines 3-8).

This was error because an invalid arrest

does not require the suppression of all of the evidence of the
circumstances gathered prior to the arrest.

4Respondent's statement is correctly termed an
admission, not a confession.
An admission is an
acknowledgment by the accused of certain facts which tend,
together with other facts, to establish his guilt; a
confession is an acknowledgment of guilt itself.
Fisher v.
United States, 324 F.2d 775 (Ca. 8 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S.
9 9 9 , r eh • e n • , 3 7 9 u • s • 8 7 3 •

a

-12-
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Even if respondent was unlawfully arrested, his
criminal prosecution would not he violative of due process
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.

Frisbie v. Collins,

342 U.S. 519, reh. den., 343 U.S. 937 (1952); State v.
Anderson, Utah, 618 P.2d 42 (1980); State v. Beck, Utah, 584
P.2d 870 (1978).

The State may still prosecute respondent,

either based solely on the second assault committed by
respondent {See footnote 1, page 2), or by amending the charge
to a lesser included offense as the State requested at the
close of the pre-trial suppression proceedings (T2 pp.
14-15; R. 43).

The suppressed

evi~ence

is necessary to fully

explain the circumstances surrounding the assaults for which
respondent is charged.
The suppressed evidence was obtained during the
officers' normal performance of their duty.
[The officers] are charged generally with
the duty of searching out any crime,
obtaining evidence and prosecuting those
engaged therein. When a police officer
sees or hears conduct which gives rise to
suspicion of crime, he not only has the
right but the duty to make observations
and investigations to determine whether
the law is being violated; and if so, to
take such measures as are necessary in the
enforcement of the law.
State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1977).

In State

v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103 (1980) this Court stated:
-13-
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Though there may be no probable cause to
make an arrest, a police officer may, in
appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for
investigating possible criminal behavior.
Id. at 105.

In the instant case the officers were obligated

to investigate the unattended truck which was blocking the
roadway and were entitled to ask respondent, when he arrived,
whether he owned and had been driving the truck.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine,
discussed in the pre-trial proceeding, applies to
incriminating statements made by an accused after law
enforcement officers have unlawfully entered an area or
unlawfully arrested an accused and renders the "fruit" of the
unlawful entry inadmissible as evidence.
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

Wong Sun v. United

The doctrine does not apply to

lawful investigation and questioning occurring prior to an
unlawful arrest.

Although an unlawful arrest may taint

subsequently obtained evidence, it would not preclude the use
of evidence obtained prior to the arrest where the
investigation and questioning were warranted.

This is

particularly true where, as in the instant case, the evidence
is to be used not to establish the elements of the offenses
for which respondent was arrested, but rather to aid in fully
explaining the circumstances behind the two assaults which
occurred after the evidence was legally obtained and after
respondent was arrested.
-14-
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Under the circumstances of this case there is no
legal nor logical reason to suppress the evidence in question.
The lower court's decision to do so was clearly error.
CONCLUSION
The lower court suppressed evidence necessary to the
prosecution based on a determination that the arrest of
respondent was unlawful.

....

The suppression of the evidence was

error because the arrest of respondent clearly met the
requirements of Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-2(3)

(1978).

Even if

the arrest of respondent was invalid, it was error to suppress
the evidence because the evidence was lawfully obtained prior
to the arrest and because the crime for which respondent is
being tried was committed after the arrest.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of August,
19 82.
DAVID L.
Attorney
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